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Abstract
We study whether probability weighting is observed when individuals are presented with a series of choices between
lotteries consisting of real non-monetary adverse outcomes, electric shocks. Our estimation of the parameters of the
probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) are similar to those obtained in previous
studies of lottery choice for negative monetary payoffs and negative hypothetical payoffs. In addition, common ratio
violations in choice behavior are widespread. Our results provide evidence that probability weighting is a general
phenomenon, independent of the source of disutility.
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1 Introduction
Expected utility theory (EUT) is the standard theoreti-
cal model of choice under risk used in economic anal-
ysis. EUT posits that the utility assigned to a lottery
or prospect is linear in the probability of each possible
outcome of the lottery. While EUT is an appealing for-
mulation for economic modeling, a number of experi-
ments have called it into question as a descriptive model
of choice under risk (see Starmer (2000) for a review of
the literature). On the other hand, speciﬁcations allowing
probabilities to be weighted by a function π(p), where
π(p) has an inverted S-shape, provide a good empirical
ﬁt to the available experimental data (see for example Pr-
elec, 1998, Wu and Gonzalez, 1996, Camerer and Ho,
1994, or Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). The inverted S-shape
corresponds to an overweighting of low probabilities and
anunderweightingofhighprobabilities. Inrecognitionof
this empirical support, probability weighting is incorpo-
ratedasakeyassumptionofseveraltheoriesofchoiceun-
der risk, including prospect theory (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979), rank dependent expected utility theory (Quig-
gin, 1993), and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992).
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A particularly striking phenomenon that can arise as a
consequence of probability weighting is the common ra-
tio violation.1 Consider two lotteries and an individual
with a utility function U(x). The ﬁrst yields a payoff of xi
6= 0 with probability pi and a zero payoff with probability
1- pi. The second lottery yields xj 6= 0 with probability pj
and zero otherwise. The linearity assumption of expected
utility theory implies that an individual who chooses the
ﬁrst lottery over the second one must also choose a lot-
tery that delivers xi with probability q*pi over a lottery
that yields xj with probability q*pj. Clearly, if piU(xi) ≥,
pjU(xj)), then q*piU(xi) ≥ q*pjU(xj)). As originally con-
jectured by Allais (1953), common ratio violations which
result in indifference curves in the probability triangle
(explained later) that fan out or fan in, have been found
to be widespread in the domain of positive payoffs for
lotteries involving monetary outcomes (see for example
Starmer and Sugden, 1989).
The empirical support underlying probability weight-
ing and common ratio violations comes primarily from
experimental studies in which all outcomes involve non-
negative monetary payments (see for example Loomes,
1991; Hey and Orme, 1994; or Harless and Camerer,
1994).2 However, many economic decisions involve the
1Common ratio violations also result when the independence ax-
iom on preferences is relaxed or violated. See Malinvaud (1952) for a
discussion of the relationship between the independence axiom and ex-
pected utility theory. See Machina (1982) for an analysis of the impli-
cations of relaxing the assumption that the independence axiom holds.
2Some recent studies using real decisions of participants in the TV
game show “Deal or No Deal” also ﬁnd support for generalized ex-
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possibility of losses. Examples include a decision to in-
vest in a stock, to choose among alternative medical pro-
cedures, or to trust another person or institution in a busi-
ness or personal transaction. A few studies have explored
decisions in the domain of losses, and they have used one
of two techniques to induce negative payoffs. In some
studies, researchers use hypothetical payoffs; examples
include Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Abdellaoui
(2000). In other studies, participants are given a real cash
endowment at the beginning of the experiment and real
losses are deducted from this initial balance; examples
include Holt and Laury (2004) and Mason et al. (2005).
However, many real life decisions involve negative
outcomes that are not monetary. Consider a cancer pa-
tient who is asked to make a choice between two un-
comfortable medical treatments that involve tradeoffs be-
tween probabilities and utilities of different prospective
states of health (e.g., radiation therapy versus extensive
surgery). Another example is the decision of a defendant
in a criminal case to accept or reject a plea bargain for a
reduced sentence in prison. The defendant faces a choice
between lotteries over the time of incarceration.
However, a methodological challenge exists when
studying decisions over non-monetary adverse outcomes:
how do we induce real outcomes of this type3 in the labo-
ratory? Some authors have used aversive stimuli to inves-
tigate other principles of decision making. For example,
Ariely et al. (2003) used annoying sounds as well as hav-
ing subjects place their ﬁngers inside a tightening vice to
study the effects of anchoring on preferences. Coursey
et al. (1987) required individuals to drink sucrose octa-
acetate, an unpleasant tasting liquid, to study willingness-
to-pay and willingness-to-accept decisions for a “bad”,
that is, a good with negative value. In this paper, we
use painful electric shocks to induce negative payoffs.
Pain is a good measure of disutility as almost everyone
would rather avoid it. In addition, as a means of induc-
ing disutility, the use of electric shocks satisﬁes Smith’s
(1982) precepts pertaining to the appropriateness of a re-
ward medium for an experiment: monotonicity and dom-
inance. We can presume that a larger shock (in either
magnitude or duration) is worse than a smaller one.4 For
pected utility models when decisions are over possible large sums of
money. De Roos and Saraﬁdis (2006) ﬁnd that rank dependent util-
ity models are better at describing decisions. Using cross-country data
from the same game, Baltusen et al. (2007) ﬁnd that theories that in-
clude reference dependence, an assumption of Prospect Theory, but not
EUT, are better at describing observed decisions.
3Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) also study choices under risk over non-
monetary losses, but their outcomes are hypothetical medical maladies.
4Indeed, self-reports of participants, who evaluated the experience
after the shocks, show that shocks were perceived negatively and shocks
of different voltages were preceived differently from each other. As de-
scribed in the procedures, participants were required to rate the experi-
ence of each trial of the experiment on a scale, which ranged from “very
unpleasant” to “very pleasant”. We ﬁnd that the stronger the shock was,
a ﬁxed duration, the disutility of a shock is monotonic
in the current, and therefore it is monotonic in its volt-
age. Furthermore, for our simple decision task, which
is described below, and given the voltage levels applied
in our experiment, it is quite reasonable to presume that
the differences between voltage levels from the alterna-
tive choices are large enough to dominate the costs of de-
ciding between alternatives. Physical pain, unlike cash
payments, also has other advantages in inducing individ-
ual incentives, in that the recipient consumes it instantly
and cannot transfer it to other individuals.
In this paper, we consider whether the phenomenon
of probability weighting, and in particular the inverted
S-shaped pattern of probability distortion, is observed
when people face lotteries that involve painful shocks,
and whether common ratio violations, which have been
observed for lotteries involving positive monetary pay-
ments, also appear in our setting. In addition, although
probability weighting can predict a complex pattern of
fanning in and fanning out inside the probability triangle,
for the particular gambles that we consider, we expect
to see more risk aversion when gambles get better (i.e.,
when there is a lower overall chance of a shock); which
means that indifference curves would tend to fan-out. We
ﬁnd that both probability weighting and common ratio vi-
olations are prominent features of our data. The median
probability weighting parameter we estimate is very simi-
lartothoseobservedindecisionsovernegativehypotheti-
calmonetarypayoffs(TverskyandKahneman, 1992; Ab-
dellaoui, 2000). The results suggest that a similar process
of probability weighting characterizes lottery choice for
bothmonetaryandnon-monetaryoutcomeswhenpayoffs
are negative.
2 Experimental design and proce-
dures
A total of 37 subjects participated in the study. Seven-
teen were male and 20 were female. The average age
of participants was 25 years, and 17 of the 37 subjects
were students. Each individual participated in the experi-
ment at a separate time, and thus during each session only
one participant was present. Sessions were conducted at
the Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
Each session lasted an average of two hours and each par-
ticipant was awarded $40 at the end of his session. Each
sessionconsistedofaseriesof180trials, inwhichineach
trial subjects had the possibility of receiving an electric
shock. Shocks were delivered using a Grass SD-9 stim-
ulator5 through shielded, gold electrodes placed 2–4 cm
the more unpleasant the experience was.
5The Grass stimulator (West Warwick, RI) was modiﬁed by attach-
ing a servo-controlled motor to the voltage potentiometer. The motorJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007 Probability weighting with shocks 236
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Figure 1: Display on subjects’ screens and timing of activity during the passive phase of the experiment
apart on the dorsum of the left foot. Each shock was a
monophasic pulse of 10–20 ms duration. During their
session, individuals were lying down in an MRI scanner.6
While in the scanner, the participant observed a computer
screen and used a handheld device to submit their deci-
sions.
At the beginning of the session, the voltage range was
titrated for each participant. The detection threshold was
determined by delivering pulses starting at zero volts and
increasing the voltage until the individual indicated that
he could feel them. The voltage was increased further,
while each participant was instructed, “When you feel
that you absolutely cannot bear any stronger shock, let
us know — this will be set as your maximum; we will not
use this value for the experiment, but rather to establish a
scale. You will never receive a shock of maximum value.”
The purpose of this procedure was to control for the het-
erogeneity of the skin resistance between subjects and to
administer a range of potentially painful and salient stim-
uli in an ethical manner. We measured the strength of
the shock administered to an individual by the parame-
ter s, where the associated voltage for an individual was
V = s(Vmin − Vmin) + Vmin, where Vmin is the detec-
tion threshold (not painful, but just noticeable) and Vmax
is the maximum value for the individual. For the remain-
der of the experiment, s took on values of 0.1, 0.3, 0.6,
and 0.9.
After the voltage titration, the ﬁrst phase of the ex-
periment, which we call the passive phase, began. The
software package, COGENT 2000 (FIL, University Col-
allowed for computer control of the voltage level without comprising
the safety of the electrical isolation in the stimulator. The motor was
controlled by a laptop through a serial interface.
6Skin conductance responses to the shocks were also registered. The
analysis of the fMRI and the skin conductance response data are re-
ported in a companion paper (see Berns et al, 2006).
lege London), was used for stimulus presentation and re-
sponse acquisition. The passive phase consisted of 120
trials. The sequence of activity in each trial is illustrated
in Figure 1. The upper part of the ﬁgure illustrates the
displays that subjects observed on their computer screen.
The lower part of the ﬁgure shows the timing of events
within each trial. At the beginning of each trial, each par-
ticipant was presented with a pie chart, called the cue,
which conveyed both the magnitude of the potential im-
pending shock and the probability with which it would be
received. The magnitude of the shock was indicated by
the size of an inner circle relative to an outer gray circle.
This outer circle corresponded to the individual’s maxi-
mum tolerable voltage, Vmax. The area of the inner circle
was Vs, where s equaled 0.1, 0.3, 0.6, or 0.9, depending
on the trial. The probability was indicated by the pro-
portion of the inner circle colored in red on participants’
computer screens, which is shown in Figure 1 as the per-
centage of the inner circle shaded in the darker color. The
ﬁve possible probabilities were 1/6, 1/3, 2/3, 5/6, and 1.
The particular example shown on the left part of Figure
1 depicts a voltage level with the value of s = 0.6, and a
1/3 probability of the shock being applied. The four pos-
sible voltage levels and ﬁve possible probabilities yielded
20 voltage-probability combinations, each of which was
presented 6 times in the 120 trials that constituted the pas-
sive phase of the experiment.
After the cue was presented for 8 seconds, the shock
was then delivered with the appropriate probability.7 The
word, “outcome,” as shown in the second image located
7The outcomes were predetermined (although unknown beforehand
to participants) to ensure that there would be at least one trial under each
of the 20 conditions (4 different voltages times 5 different probabilities)
in each of the three 60-trial fMRI scan runs. Although the outcomes
were predetermined, the total number of shocks received in each of the
conditions reﬂected the actual probabilities.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007 Probability weighting with shocks 237
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Figure 2: Display on subjects’ screens and timing of activity during the active phase of the experiment
in the upper middle of Figure 1, was presented concur-
rently with the delivery of the shock on those trials in
which a shock occurred. It also appeared at the same
point in time on those trials in which a shock was not
delivered, providing an indicator to the participant that
the trial was over. It remained on display for one sec-
ond8, after which a display consisting of a visual analog
scale appeared on the participant’s screen. The display is
shownintheupper-rightpartofFigure1. Thesubjectwas
then required to rate the experience of the trial in a range
between “very unpleasant” and “very pleasant.” To indi-
cate his rating, he marked a location on the scale, using a
cursor operated by hand. The process then continued to
the next trial.
The next phase of the session, which we call the Ac-
tive Phase, consisted of 60 trials. In each trial, individu-
als were required to choose between two of the probabil-
ity/shock combinations that were presented in the passive
phase. The available choices differed from one trial to
the next. Figure 2 shows an example of the displays that
appeared on participants’ screens during a typical trial as
well as the timing of a trial. At the beginning of each
round, a display similar to the one shown in the upper
left of the ﬁgure appeared. The ﬁgure shows two lotter-
ies presented side by side, and subjects were required to
choose one of the two using the keypad provided to them.
The two options available in a given trial always had the
property that one alternative speciﬁed both a higher volt-
age shock as well as lower probability than the other al-
ternative. For instance, the example shown in Figure 2
represents a choice between 1/6 chance of a shock with
8Following the shock, the cue remained visible for another 1 second
to prevent conditioning to the cue offset.
s = 0.9 vs. a 1/3 chance of a shock with s = 0.6.
The larger inner circle represents the larger shock (i.e.,
s = 0.9); the probability is represented by the proportion
of the area of the inner circle that is colored in red.
After the participant made his choice, there was an 8
second interval, in which the display was augmented by
an arrow indicating the lottery chosen. After the 8 sec-
onds had elapsed, the outcome was realized and the word
“outcome” was included on the display for 1 second, as
shown in the upper right part of Figure 2. Then, the cur-
rent trial ended and the next of the 60 trials that made up
the active phase began. The experimental session ended
after the active phase was completed.
3 Results
The results show that the data are consistent with prob-
ability weighting, and that the sample parameter value
of the particular probability weighting function we esti-
mate is very close to the values reported in previous stud-
ies. We ﬁrst tested the hypothesis that expected utility
theory can explain our data. To do so, we estimated the
value of a prospect or lottery, V(L)=
P
iπ(pi)U(xi), where
pi is the probability of outcome xi. using the speciﬁca-
tion for probability weighting of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992).9 Under this speciﬁcation, the value of a prospect
that yields non-positive payoffs under all possible real-
izations is given by:
9Our parametric estimations of the probability weighting function
using alternative functional forms such as those proposed in Tversky
and Fox (1995), and Wu and Gonzalez (1996) result in similar conclu-
sion.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007 Probability weighting with shocks 238
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−λ
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γ
i
(
P
i p
γ
i )1/γ |xi|α (1)
The expected utility hypothesis is consistent only with
γ = 1. In contrast, previous estimates of the median value
of γ for samples of experimental participants incurring
hypothetical monetary losses are .69 obtained by Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992) and .70 observed by Abdel-
laoui (2000). All values γ ∈ (0,1) imply an inverted S-
shape probability weighting function, in which relatively
low probabilities are over weighted, and relatively high
probabilities are underweighted (probabilities of 0 and 1
receive accurate weight for all γ ∈ (0,1].) The parame-
ter λ is a scaling factor. The parameter α measures the
convexity (or concavity) of the utility function. The vari-
able xi is the voltage of the shocks administered. There is
no guide from prior research about the appropriate level
of λ or α because there is no reason to believe that the
scale or curvature of the utility function would be the
same for electric shocks as for the real and hypothetical
monetary payments previous authors have investigated,
though there is evidence (Stevens, 1961) that the psycho-
logical reaction to the intensity of electric shocks applied
to the ﬁngers follows a power function with an exponent
of approximately 3.5.
Because we did not elicit certainty equivalents in our
experiments, we used a ranking procedure to derive a
measure of the relative value of each of the 20 lotteries
to each subject. There were 190 possible lottery pairs,
but we only observed actual choices for 60 pairs for each
individual (i.e., all those pairs for which there was a
tradeoff between higher probability and higher pain de-
termined by the value of s). For these sixty pairs, indi-
viduals’ choices yielded a revealed preference between
the two lotteries. To construct “revealed” preferences for
the other 130 pairs (those that were not presented to the
subject), we applied a strict dominance criterion. We as-
sumed that individual i would have always chosen a lot-
tery with a lower probability and lower pain over a higher
pain, higherprobabilityoption.10 Wedeterminedtherank
or “relative preference” of each of the 20 lotteries based
onthepercentageoftimesthatitwas“revealedpreferred”
to other lotteries. This procedure yields a complete and
transitive preference ordering of the 20 lotteries. We then
used the ranked lotteries, determined separately for each
individual participant, as data to ﬁt the speciﬁcation in
(1). The parameters, α, λ, and γ, were estimated jointly
using nonlinear least squares regression with normally
distributed errors.11
10Implicit is the assumption that in decisions in which there are no
tradeoffs between probability and pain (where one alternative has both
higher voltage and probability than the other), the subject would not
make common ratio violations.
11Other authors such as Tversky and Kahneman, (1992), Camerer
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46%
Figure 3: Percentage of subjects for whom the γ values of
1 or 0.69 fell within the 95% conﬁdence interval of their
individual γ estimate
The mean estimated value of the probability weight-
ing parameter γ for the 37 subjects was 0.659, with a
standard deviation among the 37 individual estimates of
0.218. The median estimated value was 0.685.12 Fe-
males tended to have higher estimates (median=0.769 vs.
0.570 for males), but the difference between the two gen-
ders was not signiﬁcant. We then classiﬁed our subjects
into groups based on whether (a) the EUT value of 1 or
(b) the value of γ estimated in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) of 0.69, fell within the 95% conﬁdence interval
of the estimated individual γ (individual estimated val-
ues and standard errors can be found in the Appendix).
Forty-six percent (17 out of 37) of our subjects’ esti-
mated probability weighting parameters were consistent
with Tversky-Kahneman but not with EUT, whereas 14%
(5 out of 37) were consistent with EUT but not with
Tversky-Kahneman. The rest of the subjects were con-
sistent with both values (24%) or with neither (16%).13
Figure 3 shows the proportion of estimated values that
fell into the four categories listed above.
and Ho (1994) and Tversky and Fox (1995) have also made paramet-
ric estimates of the probability weighting function and the utility func-
tion. Some authors such as Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and Pinto
(2000), have used parameter free estimations employing a trade-off
techniqueofWakkerandDeneffe(1996). Overall, however, thereseems
to be little difference in the median values of the estimated γ parameters
using either method.
12The estimated parameters were robust to a wide range of economi-
cally relevant initial values.
13Using the trade-off technique, Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) found
that over 80% of their subjects exhibited a probability weighting func-
tion with lower and upper subadditivity (i.e, the inverted S-shape).
Other authors do not report individual data for their entire sample. In
line with Bleichrodt and Pinto’s results, we ﬁnd that about 84% of or
subjects exhibit probability weighting consistent with subadditivity.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007 Probability weighting with shocks 239
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We now consider the incidence of common ratio viola-
tions in the data. Letsh be the more painful and sl be the
less painful of two alternative potential shocks presented
as a pair-wise choice, and let ph and pl be the higher and
lower probabilities among the two alternatives, respec-
tively. In our experiment, common ratio violations were
observed when the lottery (sh , pl = 1/6) was chosen over
(sl , ph = 2/6), but (sl , ph = 4/6) was chosen over (sh, pl
= 2/6), or alternatively, vice versa. Within the context of
the Marschak-Machina triangle and under the assumption
that the indifference curves are linear14, the ﬁrst sequence
of decisions corresponds to “fanning in” of indifference
curves; the second sequence, on the other hand, is con-
sistent with “fanning out” of indifference curves. Figure
4 depicts the Marschak-Machina (M-M) triangle with in-
14We are aware that with only two points in the border of the MM
triangle, we cannot make inferences about the shapes of the indifference
curves. We use linear indifference curves in the ﬁgures for the speciﬁc
purpose of illustrating the fanning effects in an easy manner.
differencelines. Anindividualwhoisindifferentbetween
x and y, and indifferent between z and w will have parallel
indifference lines passing through each of the two pairs of
points. However, if the individual prefers x to y, then her
indifference line will have a higher slope as shown by the
darker dashed line passing through x in the ﬁgure. Under
EUT, if x is preferred to y, then z is preferred to w (shown
by the lighter dashed line passing through z). A choice of
w would constitute a common ratio violation, and would
imply that the indifference line passing through w has a
smaller slope than the one passing through x, as depicted
by the darker solid line in the ﬁgure. Note that the choice
of x and w means that the indifference curves are “fan-
ning out”. Similarly, Figure 5 depicts “fanning in.” In the
active phase of the experiment, there were a total of six
instances in which common ratio violations could occur.
The observed type and number of violations per subject
can be found in the Appendix.
The results show that the average number of common
ratio violations by individual was 1.95 with a standard
deviation of 1.39, which is clearly different from the pre-
diction of EUT.15 There is a tendency to commit more
fanning out violations than fanning in violations. This is
not surprising, as indifference curves that fan out are con-
sistent with overweighting of small probabilities. About
68% of the subjects (25 out of 37) committed one or more
fanning out violations, whereas about 46% (17 out of 37)
committed one or more fanning in violations. The Fisher
exact test shows that the null hypothesis that the propor-
tion of subjects who commit at least one fanning in and
fanning out violations are the same is rejected in favor
of the alternative of more people committing fanning out
violations (p = 0.049; one-tailed). Five subjects commit-
ted fanning in violations only; in contrast, seventeen sub-
jects committed uniquely fanning out violations. Finally,
there were small differences between the average number
of violations committed by females (2.10; std = 1.37) as
compared to males (1.76, std = 1.43).
We also considered whether there was consistency be-
tween our above classiﬁcation of subjects (Figure 3) and
the observed number of common ratio violations. None
of the ﬁve subjects whose estimated γ value was consis-
tent with only EUT committed more than two common
ratio violations. In contrast, the number of violations by
subjects with estimated γ signiﬁcantly less than 1 ranged
from zero to ﬁve. Overall, however, there are no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant differences in the median number of vio-
lations between these two groups (p > 0.188, one-tailed).
Although the overall fanning effect was as predicted,
there were large individual differences. Some partici-
pants showed no fanning; whereas others showed fanning
15The Friedman test for no differences between the observe number
of violations versus the number that would happen randomly can be
rejected (Chi-square 10.80; df = 1; p < 0.01).Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007 Probability weighting with shocks 240
in the opposite directions. Were these consistent differ-
ences, or just random variation? We found that, within an
individual, the direction of violations was consistent, in
a speciﬁc sense, with their overall choice behavior in the
60 trials of the active phase. To study this consistency, we
computed a “mean fanning effect” for each subject from
the six instances where individuals could switch prefer-
ences, and we asked whether this effect could be pre-
dicted from an index of fanning computed from the re-
maining 54 cases. Fanning out is indicated by a lower
tendency to choose the low-probability-high-shock op-
tion when overall shock probabilities are smaller (i.e.,
closer to the top of the M-M triangle in Figure 4). Us-
ing the 54 decisions between which common ratio viola-
tions cannot be detected from decisions, we conducted a
regression with the chosen lottery as the dependent vari-
able. The independent variables were the difference in
the logs of the shock intensity of the two options, the dif-
ference in the logs of the probabilities of a shock under
the two options, and the sum of the two probabilities of
receiving a shock under the two options. The regression
coefﬁcient for this last variable, which is a measure of
the distance from the top of the M-M triangle, was our
index of the fanning effect. The coefﬁcient takes on a
smaller value, the more the tendency toward fanning out.
We found a positive correlation between the individual
estimated coefﬁcients of the fanning index, and whether
they committed more fanning out than fanning in viola-
tions (r = .31, t(35) = 1.95, p = .0293, one-tailed).16
Thus, individuals differ in a consistent manner in the di-
rection and magnitude of this effect.
4 Discussion
In this paper we provide evidence that non-linear proba-
bility weighting, which has been observed when prospec-
tive losses are framed in terms of money, also occur in
lottery choices when real adverse outcomes are induced
with a non-monetary medium. As in previous studies,
our estimated values of the probability weighting param-
eters provide little support for EUT. We ﬁnd that about
14% of our subjects’ estimated probability weighting pa-
rameters is consistent with EUT. In contrast, about 46%
of the subjects overweight small probabilities and under-
weight large probabilities, exhibiting a typical inverted
S-shape probability weighting function. Furthermore, the
estimated sample median probability weighting parame-
ter we obtain is closely in line with values reported in
previous studies. This suggests that probability weight-
ing acts in a similar manner for lottery choice when out-
16With respect to the six critical cases where preference reversals can
be observed, a reliability test also shows that decisions are consistent
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.45).
comes are measured in terms of physical pain as well as
for hypothetical monetary transfers. This result is con-
sistent with the conjecture that probability weighting is
a general phenomenon, and independent of the source of
disutility.
We also ﬁnd that common ratio violations, which are
inconsistent with EUT, are widespread. A greater pro-
portion of subjects commit violations consistent with in-
difference curves that fan out than with fanning in. How-
ever, there are large individual differences in the direction
andincidenceoftheviolations. Despitethesedifferences,
we were able to determine that the direction of subjects’
violations is largely consistent with their overall choice
behavior, and not random.
In our view, the results we obtain are encouraging ev-
idence that traditional methodologies used in economics
and psychology to study decisions in the domain of nega-
tive payoffs lead to the same principles of decision mak-
ing as those applied in decisions over non-monetary me-
dia with real losses. Indeed, we reach almost identical
conclusions to previous studies. Our results also suggest
a conjecture that in the domain of positive payoffs, the
probability weighting parameters estimated for monetary
payments would carry over to non-monetary media. In
the future, we believe that the methodology of applying
physical pain to study decision making may be used to
explore the robustness of other behavioral anomalies ob-
served in the laboratory that occur when payoffs are neg-
ative.
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Appendix.
Estimates of individual γ parameters, and type and num-
ber of fanning violations
Subject Sex Est. γ Std. err. Fan out Fan in
1 F 1.0127890 0.0796662 2 0
2 F 0.3915420 0.1450381 0 0
3 M 0.5452798 0.1469481 1 0
4 F 0.8426407 0.0907564 3 0
5 F 0.7069833 0.1078082 2 0
6 M 0.7641525 0.1032662 1 2
7 M 0.5423165 0.1307505 1 0
8 M 0.9610685 0.0648182 1 0
9 F 0.4574296 0.1382386 1 0
10 M 0.4818398 0.1515036 0 1
11 M 0.8285788 0.1330844 1 1
12 F 0.2973379 0.1289225 0 0
13 M 0.3323089 0.1426116 0 0
14 M 0.6006711 0.1175138 0 0
15 F 0.2707158 0.1300445 1 0
16 F 0.4599991 0.0932652 1 2
17 M 0.6856989 0.1550794 0 5
18 F 0.7670457 0.1119126 3 1
19 F 0.7078283 0.1031506 4 0
20 M 0.4624952 0.1245585 0 0
21 F 1.0176710 0.0874302 1 0
22 M 0.8409525 0.0796012 1 1
23 M 0.5703915 0.1138435 0 1
24 F 0.9963527 0.1260562 2 0
25 M 0.6664429 0.1116457 1 2
26 F 0.4039314 0.1187758 0 0
27 F 1.0344640 0.0756161 0 1
28 F 0.7988346 0.1216859 1 1
29 M 0.5665003 0.1288915 2 0
30 F 0.7718875 0.1614382 0 4
31 M 0.5567840 0.1339346 2 2
32 M 0.3608489 0.1084658 0 1
33 F 0.7960892 0.1137703 2 2
34 F 0.9279254 0.1309254 3 0
35 M 0.7009950 0.1272274 2 1
36 F 0.7771528 0.0873558 1 2
37 F 0.4700133 0.1200721 2 0